Tulsa Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 3

1976

Preemption under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible
State Regulation of Nuclear Facilities' Location, Transportation of
Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Waste Disposal
Richard F. Yates

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard F. Yates, Preemption under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State Regulation of
Nuclear Facilities' Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Waste Disposal, 11
Tulsa L. J. 397 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss3/6

This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.

Yates: Preemption under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State

PREEMPTION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
OF 1954: PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION OF
NUCLEAR FACILITIES' LOCATION, TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL

The doctrine of preemption arises from the "supremacy clause'
of the United States Constitution which elevates federal law above
that of the states.' State laws are not permitted to clash with
constitutional federal enactments and those which offend this principle
2
are unconstitutional and void.
Inextricably interwoven with the question of preemption is a
determination that the supervening federal statute is constitutional. To
be thus it must have been enacted pursuant to one of the enumerated
powers of Congress specified in article I, section 8.1 At one time the
tenth amendment4 was also given some significance in interpreting the
delegation of authority to Congress, but for over thirty years has been
regarded as simply a truism (viz., whatever was not delegated to
Congress is reserved to the states").
The existence of a comprehensive federal plan governing a
particular subject raises the spectre of preemption. The Atomic
Energy Act of 19546 presents such a situation.
1. U.S. CONSr. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1971),
affd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X provides: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
5. Estep & Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental
Relations Problem, 60 MicH. L. REv. 41, 45 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Estep & Adelman].
6. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970). The Act was
originally passed in 1946 but was completely revised in 1954.
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At the outset it should be noted that the constitutionality of the
Atomic Energy Act stands on firm ground and never has been questioned. 7 But with the growing interest in the development of atomic
energy and its attendant hazards, a number of states have attempted
to enter the field by passing legislation which purports to regulate these
matters." The problem is to determine which of these are areas of
legitimate state concern and which have been precluded by the Atomic
Energy Act.
The following study is not intended to be exhaustive. It merely
explores the permissible limits of state regulation in three areas:
nuclear power plant and production facility siting, the transportation of
radioactive materials and the disposal of radioactive wastes.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL STATUTORY SCHEME:
THE

1946 ACT,

THE

1954 ACT AND THE 1959 AMENDMENT

Federal involvement with civilian uses of atomic energy began
with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 9 This legislation quickly
followed the successful demonstration of nuclear fission by the Manhattan project architects and was drafted with a conscious awareness
of the awesome potential of this new and unfamiliar power souce. 10
With its primary objective being to ensure the common defense and
security," the Act established a virtual government monopoly over the
12
peacetime uses of nuclear energy.
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created 3 and vested
7. See Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 44-50. The law was enacted by Congress
pursuant to its powers to regulate interstate commerce (U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3),
to provide for the common defense and security (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14)
and to make rules respecting United States property and territory (U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 8). Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 46.
8. 5 CCH ATOM. EN. L REP. %16,503 (1967).
9. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755, now Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
10. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 1(a), 60 Stat. 755.
11. Id., 60 Stat. 756.
12. Id. § 1(b) (4), 60 Stat. 756. The Act did not deprive the states of their traditional authority over three major sources of radiation: (1) naturally occurring radioactive materials (other than "source materials" as defined in note 15 inlra); (2) X-ray
apparatus; and (3) atomic particle accelerators. Helman, Pre-Emption: Approaching
Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 54
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Helman].
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 2(a)(1), 60 Stat. 756. In 1974 the
Atomic Energy Commission was abolished and replaced by two other agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233.
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with ownership 14 of all facilities producing fissionable materials. 15
These were to be operated by the AEC or under contract with the8
17
AEC."' Similarly, fissionable materials and byproduct materials'
were to be owned and controlled by the AEC. Source materials' 9 and
the utilization of fissionable materials 20 were to be regulated by licensing procedures.
Between 1946 and 1954 there was extensive development of the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. In an effort to broaden the scope and

increase the intensity of these activities, Congress passed the Atomic
Energy Act of 195421 which brought to an end the government monopoly over nuclear energy and sought to promote the growth of this

industry in the private sector. 2 Consonant with this aim the new legislation marked a departure from the approach taken by its predecessor
in several significant respects.
The 1954 Act permitted, for the first time, the private ownership

and operation of production facilities, the private ownership of byproduct materials and the leasing of special nuclear materials. 23 In
exchange for this relinquishment of ownership and control by the
14. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 4(c) (1), 60 Stat. 759.
15. mhe term 'fissionable material' means plutonium, uranium enriched in the
isotope 235, any other material which the Commission determines to be capable
of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction of
the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing; but
does not include source materials .
Id. § 5(a) (1), 60 Stat. 760. "[T]he term 'source material' means uranium, thorium,
or any other material which is determined by the Commission. . . to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable materials . . . ." Id. § 5(b) (1), 60 Stat. 761.
In the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the term "special nuclear material" has been
substituted for that of "fissionable material," although the definitions are substantially
the same. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 11(t), 42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1970).
16. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, § 4(c) (2), 60 Stat. 759.
17. Id. § 5(a)(2), 60 Stat. 760.
18. Id. § 5(c) (2), 60 Stat. 763. " Mhe term 'byproduct material' means any radioactive material (except fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the processes of producing or utilizing fissionable
material." Id. § 5(c)(1), 60 Stat. 763.
19. Id. § 5(b) (2), 60 Stat. 761. Source materials are defined in note 15 supra.
The AEC's jurisdiction over source material commenced "after removal from its place
of deposit in nature." Id.
20. Id. § 7(a), 60 Stat. 764.
21. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1970).
22. Helman, supra note 12, at 53.
23. Id.; see Atomic Energy Act of 1954 §§ 101, 53(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2093 (c)
(1970); Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 81, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV, 1974); Cavers,
State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Cavers]. In 1964 the Act was further amended to allow for private
ownership of special nuclear materials. Act of Aug. 26, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-489, §
4, 78 Stat. 603.
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government, conditions were imposed in the form of a pervasive licensing and regulatory scheme to guard against radiation hazards.24 This
new format also engendered a shift in roles for the AEC from those
of exclusive developer and contract administrator to those of promotersponsor and regulator of private development. 25 The goals of the 1954
Act saw a change in emphasis as well, now evincing a legislative
design to spur the development of atomic energy in the interest of the
general welfare and an increased standard of living "to the maximum
extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the
health and safety of the public ...
26
With the great increase in the intensity and diversity of atomic
energy use, Congress witnessed a greater need for control to be exerted
at the local level.2 7 In 1959 the Atomic Energy Act was amended to
allow the AEC to share some of its regulatory authority with any state
upon the execution of an agreement between its governor and the
ABC.1 8 The purposes expressed in the 1959 amendment reflected a
dual desire to effectuate a coordinated, orderly and effective regulatory
plan and to clarify the respective responsibilities of the states and the
29
AEC.
The origins and development of the federal statutory complex
governing atomic energy display an evolving congressional policy with
respect to the peaceful uses of the atom. Federal involvement began
with the discovery of nuclear fission and, except for those sources of
radiation traditionally regulated by the states,80 there was absolute federal control in the form of a governmental proprietorship. 8 In an
effort to exploit the burgeoning interest of private industry, Congress
24. E. STASON, S. ESTEP & W. PmcE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 1223 n.68 (1959) [hereinafter cited as ATOMS AND THE LAW].
25. Helman, supra note 12, at 55.
26. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 3(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1970).
27. Helman, supra note 12, at 55.
28. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
29. Id. § 274(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1970).
30. See note 12 supra.
31. Although the federal government only owned the facilities producing fissionable
materials, the fissionable materials themselves and by-product materials, this was enough
to establish a government monopoly. Obviously, the distribution of fissionable materials
was under the absolute control of the AEC and without fissionable materials there could
be no nuclear fission. Because the federal government began to control nuclear fission
at the time of its discovery and established such a complete program for control, it has
been suggested that states possess no historic police powers over atomic energy per se.
See Recent Cases, Environmental Law-Implied Federal Pre-emption-StatesPrecluded
from Regulating Radioactive Emissions from Nuclear Power Plants, 37 Mo. L. REv. 106,
115-116 (1972).
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supplanted the system of direct government ownership and operation
with a comprehensive regulatory scheme which allowed the federal
government to retain its sweeping control over radiation hazards.
Throughout this period and until the passage of the 1959 amendment,
reference to the states' authority respecting these matters is conspicuously absent. The 1959 amendment acknowledged limited authority
in the states to regulate radiation hazards, but only upon the execution
of an agreement with the AEC.
The foregoing considerations had induced authorities, far in
advance of any litigation on the subject, to take the position that the
federal government had preempted the field.32 Recently, the Supreme
when it affirmed an Eighth Circuit
Court verified those predictions
33
held.
so
had
which
decision
PRECLUSION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF
THE NORTHERN STATES DECISION

1954:

A privately owned electric power company constructed a nuclear
fueled electric generating plant under the authority of a provisional permit issued by the AEC. Subsequently, the company sought a waste
disposal permit from the state pollution control agency as required by
state law for the discharge of pollutants. The waste disposal permit
was issued, but subject to conditions regulating the radioactivity level
of effluent from the plant. The restrictions covered the same areas
as, but were considerably more stringent than, the AEC regulations
imposed under federal law. The company challenged the constitutionality of the state controls, charging that they were precluded under the
34
Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The district court held for the company
and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota:33 "[Tjhe federal government has exclusive authority under
the doctrine of pre-emption to regulate the construction and operation
of nuclear power plants, which necessarily includes regulation of the
levels of radioactive effluents discharged from the plant." '
32. ATOMS AND THE LAw, supra note 24, at 1058-74; Estep & Adelman, supra note
5, at 79; Helman, supra note 12, at 67. The AEC has consistently maintained that there
was preemption. See 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1975).
33. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
34. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970).
35. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
36. Id. at 1154. But see Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group v. Train, 507 F.2d
743 (10th Cir. 1974). There the Tenth Circuit held that the discharge of radioactive
materials into navigable waters from a nuclear power plant came under the jurisdiction
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Limited to its facts the ruling in Northern States is not dispositive
of the present inquiry because its precise holding is quite narrow.
Nevertheless, the well-reasoned analysis used by the court will undoubtedly serve as compelling authority for all future issues of preclusion arising under the Atomic Energy Act. This conclusion is fortified
cases specifically
by the consideration that there are no other federal
7
addressing this question in the nuclear energy area.1
The Eighth Circuit prescribed in a three-prong test for finding a
state's regulation preempted. First, where the state laws are in such
irreconcilable conflict that compliance with both is a "physical
impossibility," the state law must yield to the supervening federal Act.88
Second, in the absence of such a direct clash, if Congress has declared
"unequivocally and expressly" that the authority it grants shall be exclusive, then concurrent or complementary state regulation within the
occupied field is barred.3 9 Third, even where there is no direct conflict between the statutes and although Congress has not expressly
declared its intent that federal regulation should be exclusive, a court
may infer an intent to preempt based on: (1) the development and
legislative history of the statute, (2) the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme it establishes and the regulations enacted pursuant to it,
(3) the nature of the subject matter regulated and whether it demands
uniformity of treatment, and (4) whether in a particular case the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of Congress.4"
41
The state statute in question did not conflict with the federal law
and Congress had not expressly declared an intent to preempt under
the Atomic Energy Act,42 but the court proceeded to determine that
of the Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1265, 1281-1291, 1311-1328, 13411345, 1361-1376 (Supp. IV, 1974). Since states may set the water quality standards
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1160(c) (1970)), then
under the Tenth Circuit decision they may regulate radioactive discharge into waterways.
This flies in the face of the Northern States decision.
37. However, some state courts have considered the subject. See Boswell v. City
of Long Beach, 1 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 4045 (Cal. 1960); Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 5 Il. App. 3d 800, 284 N.E.2d 342 (1972). They have
also found state regulation preempted.
38. 447 F.2d at 1146.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1146-47.

41. Id. at 1147.
42. Id.
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such an intent should be implied,4 3 relying most heavily on the first of
the four factors mentioned above.

It should be observed that the doctrine of preemption is nothing
more than a means of testing the allowable degree of interference
between state and federal regulation. With this consideration in mind
and the basic workings of the Northern States case exposed, a decisionmaking framework can be prescribed for identifying the permissible
bounds of state regulation concerning nuclear activities. Generally, it
appears the there are four possible situations of relative federal-state
involvement which will determine the fate of the particular state
regulation.
Direct Conflict
If the state statute directly conflicts with federal regulations such
that compliance with both is a physical impossibility, then the state
statute is void.44 This has been extended to include situations where
the state regulation conflicts with the policy of the federal statute even
though there was no direct clash with any particular federal provision.45
The policy of the Atomic Energy Act is to maintain the proper
balance between the development of atomic energy and the protection
of persons and property against radiological hazards. 48 Then, arguably,
every state statute which unreasonably restricts the location or conduct
of nuclear activities within its jurisdiction is preempted by the Atomic
47
Energy Act.
Regulation Outside of the PreemptedField
At the other end of the spectrum is the situation where the state
attempts to regulate matters not within the field of the federal statute's
operation. This right is reserved to a state under the tenth amend43. See id. at 1147-52. In particular, the court found the legislative history of the
1959 amendment to be most persuasive, especially in light of its expressed purpose to
clarify the respective federal-state responsibilities in the nuclear field. See note 29 supra
and accompanying text.
44. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
45. Note, "Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946: Ten
Years of Federalism,60 HAv. L. REv. 262, 263 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Occupation
of the Field]. This is essentially an alternative way of viewing the fourth factor considered in Northern States for a finding of implied congressional intent to preempt. See
note 40 supra and accompanying text.
46. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
47. However, this may be just another way of saying that state regulation within
the preempted field is prohibited. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 6

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:397

ment. 4s However, to apply this principle it is necessary to define the
40
The
boundaries of the field covered by the federal enactment.
Northern States decision provides some assistance in this regard.
Carried to its logical end, the court's language suggests that the
field occupied by the Atomic Energy Act is that of the regulation of
radiological health and safety. This was the concern addressed by the
licensing requirements established by the 1954 Act as a prerequisite
to private ownership.5" And it would be unnecessary for a state to
enter into an agreement with the AEC pursuant to section 274 of the
Atomic Energy Act5 1 to gain some limited regulatory powers in this
field, unless it were already fully occupied by the federal statute.5 2
Also, each and every one of the pervasive strictures prescribed by the
Act concerns precisely this subject. 53 Finally, only the uniformity
characteristic of federal superintendence could ensure the achievement
of an important congressional objective by striking the proper balance
between the promotion of nuclear energy and the protection of the publie against radiological hazards. 54
Technically, the field covered by the Act does not extend beyond
the regulation of radiological health and safety. Subsection (k) of section 274 stipulates that "[nlothing in this section shall be construed
to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities
for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."55 Furthermore, the ABC has consistently maintained that it lacks authority
under the Atomic Energy Act to consider anything but radiation
effects. 56 However, even a state statute which does not purport to
48. See note 4 supra. This assumes, of course, that there is no direct conflict with
any other federal statute or regulation.
49. Occupation of the Field, supra note 45, at 266.
50. 447 F.2d at 1150.
51. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. Section 274 is the 1959 amendment.
52. 447 F.2d at 1149.
53. Id. at 1152-53.
54. Id. at 1153-54.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1970). The Northern States court also found this section
useful as evidence of an implied congressional intent to preempt. "Unless the federal
government possessed exclusive authority over radiation hazards, the inclusion of the
[words 'other than protection against radiation hazards'] would have been meaningless
and unnecessary." 447 F.2d at 1150.
56. See New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court held that the AEC
was required to consider nonradiological factors in its preparation of an environmental
impact statement pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act; Note, Federal and
State Responsibilities in the Environmental Control of Nuclear Power Plants, 2 N.Y.U.
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regulate radiation hazards may be struck down if it "'stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.' ,5
Between the two extremes discussed above are the situations of
"concurrent" and "complimentary" regulation within the occupied
field."15 8 If Congress had expressly declared its intention that the field
of radiological hazard regulation was preempted, then it would be clear
that neither concurrent nor complementary regulation would be permitted by a state. 59 Northern States only found an implied intent to
preempt.60 Therefore, it is necessary to determine whether the situation is altered by this fact.
ConcurrentRegulation
Closely adhering to the legislative history and the language of the
1959 amendment, Northern States concluded that where a federal
R v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 20, 3041 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Control
of Nuclear Power Plants].

57. 447 F.2d at 1147. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. This would most
likely happen where a state had enacted statutory provisions which were uniquely applicable to nuclear facilities and activities (see notes 97-102 infra and accompanying text).
An alternative way of viewing this situation which stays within the theoretical bounds
of preemption defined earlier would be the following: arguably, the only significant differences between nuclear and nonnuclear activities is the existence of radiological hazards in the case of the former. Because of this, a statute which singles out nuclear facilities and activities for special treatment is attempting to regulate radiological health and
safety, regardless of its ostensible purpose. Therefore, state legislation which discriminates against the nuclear industry might be invalid since the Atomic Energy Act has
preempted the field of regulation of radiation hazards. (This also suggests the question
of what state regulation is permissible within an occupied field, discussed in the text immediately following this note.)
58. The term "concurrent" refers to state and federal statutes regulating the same
aspect of the same field. It should be contrasted with the term "complementary" which
refers to state and federal statutes regulating different aspects of the same field. Under
the Atomic Energy Act the field theoretically preempted is the regulation of radiation
hazards (see discussion in text immediately preceding this note). The subjects of nuclear facility siting, transportation of radioactive materials, and the disposal of radioactive wastes represent some aspects of this field.
59. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text. An express intent to preempt
is almost never present. In fact, Congress explicitly rejected a proposal to include in
the 1959 amendment a clear delineation of those areas over which the AEC was to have
sole authority. Hearings on Federal-State Relations Before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 307-308 (1959). Mr. Lowenstein (Office of the
General Counsel, AEC) stated in the committee hearings:
We thought that this act without saying so in so many words did make
clear that there is pre-emption here, but we have tried to avoid defining the
precise extent of that pre-emption, feeling that it is better to leave these kinds
of detailed questions perhaps up to courts later to be resolved.
Id. at 308.
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regulation under the Atomic Energy Act sets a particular standard the
state will not be permitted to impose a stricter standard. 01 And from
from what appears above, it is clear that a state could not successfully
enforce a more lenient standard."' However, Northern States does not
consider the visability of concurrent state regulations which are identical to those adopted by the AEC."'
The possibility of limited regulation of radiation hazards through
the medium of uniform federal standards presents an interesting
approach for a state to follow. This would satisfy some states seeking
greater control over the nuclear industry, 4 would be in harmony with
the policy dictates of the Atomic Energy Act demanding uniform controls and would aid the AEC in enforcement of its regulations. As
mentioned earlier, section 274 of the Act provides for an agreement
with the AEC which allows for delegation of such authority to a state."z
Nevertheless, there are certain features of this pact which distinguish it from the situation of mere unauthorized concurrent enforcement of the uniform federal regulations. First, the Act sets certain
conditions which must be met by the state before it can enter into such
an agreement. 6 These largely concern the capability of the state to
regulate in the area ceded to it by the AEC and the compatibility of
the state's program with the AEC's program. 7 Furthermore, the AEC
may terminate the agreement if the state is not competently exercising
61. 447 F.2d at 1153-54.
62. This would be in direct conflict with the supervening federal law. See note 44
supra and accompanying text.
63. The legislative history of the 1959 amendment does not appear to foreclose this
possibility either. The committee report which accompanied the bill said: "It is not
intended to leave any room for the exercise of dual or concurrent jurisdiction by States
to control radiation hazards by regulating byproduct, source or special nuclear materials
But, in continuing, the legis.... ." S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1959).
lators identified their real concern and the significance they attached to the terms "dual
or concurrent jurisdiction":
The Joint Committee believes that it is important to emphasize that the radiation
standards adopted by states under the agreement of this bill should either be
identical or compatible with those of the Federal Government . . .. [and]
recognizes . . . the dangers of conflicting, overlapping, and inconsistent standards in different jurisdictions, to the hinderance of industry and jeopardy of
public safety.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. However, it would not enable a state to set its own safety standards as Minnesota was attempting to do in Northern States.
65. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970). Currently, there
are twenty-five "agreement" states. 5 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 1 16508 (1974).
66. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (1970).
67. As a practical matter this means that the "agreement" state adopts applicable
federal regulations. See, e.g., transportation of radioactive wastes, note 120 infra and
accompanying text.
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this authority. 8 Second, under this agreement the state is acting with
authority delegated to it by the AEC. 69 Thus, in executing such a contract a state is relieved from a preemption attack regarding matters covered by the agreement because it is acting as an agent of the federal
government. Third, while such an agreement is in effect, the AEC
is actually supplanted with respect to the matters it covers.70 Therefore, the problem of dual controls which ordinarily appears with concurrent regulation in an occupied field does not exist.
Despite these qualifications, a "nonagreemenf' state which adopts
and enforces the uniform federal standards is not likely to have its statute challenged, provided that it has demonstrated a capability to
properly enforce these regulations and that it limits regulation to that
which would be permitted if it had entered into a formal agreement
with the AEC. 7 1 This is true because the dual congressional objectives
of promoting nuclear energy and protecting against radiation hazards
would be well served by a state ably acting in such a capacity. Furthermore, in an enforcement proceeding the AEC would be likely to cooperate with, rather than oppose, the prosecuting state for two reasons:
first, such efforts assist that agency in its enforcement procedures; second, the failure to do so by that agency would amount to an admission
of an unwillingness to enforce its own regulations.
Assuming that the only conflict is over -the issue of preemption
(viz., there is an admitted violation of the regulation in question), then
whichever side the AEC chooses to be on will prevail, since it and only
68. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(j) (1970).
69. Id.§ 274(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1970).
70. Id.
71. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), where the Court sustained a state
law penalizing interstate carriers for operating without an ICC permit; ATOMS AND THE
LAW, supra note 24, at 1074. Illinois currently regulates "low level" radioactive waste
disposal under the uniform federal standards it has adopted, although it is not an "agreement" state. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
A strong case can be made for limiting the extent of regulation by a "nonagreement" state to that which would be allowed under an agreement with the AEC. The
1959 amendment which authorizes these agreements has been used as an important index
of congressional intent concerning the respective federal-state roles under the Atomic
Energy Act. (See note 43 supra and accompanying text.) Since Congress has provided
that certain responsibilities may not be delegated to a' state under this agreement, it is
not likely that a court would sustain a state's attempt to regulate these matters absent
such an agreement. (However, New York has reserved the constitutional rights and
powers it possesses independent of the agreement in its pact with the AEC, apparently
believing that it has some authority in the field of radiation hazard regulation apart
from that delegated to it under the contract. 5 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. f 16508
(1974).)
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it has the authority to issue such regulations. 2 Additionally, persons
regulated by the state, realizing these facts, are not likely to engage
in fruitless litigation challenging the state's authority in the first place.
Hence, the adoption and enforcement of the uniform federal standards
to the extent that would be allowed by a section 274 agreement would
render academic the question of a state's authority to regulate in this
fashion.
Complementary Regulation
Generally speaking, the regulations issued pursuant to the Atomic
Energy Act are comprehensive.73 But, as will be seen later, the AEC
has not exercised the full limit of its statutory authority with respect
to certain activities. Where a federal agency has failed to act, may a
state fill the gaps left by the agency's regulations in an occupied field?
The Northern States decision leaves this question unanswered, but
there is authority to suggest that a state may regulate in such a situa74
tion if interference with the federal master plan is kept to a minimum.
"[The problem is one of balancing the evils attendant upon the imposition of another regulating agency set of rules against the harm to be
7'
done by leaving the industry some particular unregulated. 5
It would be desirable to again examine the permissible bounds of
authority under a section 274 agreement in order to prescribe rules for
state regulation absent such an agreement. Unfortunately, that analysis
is not so handily applied here. By implication, an "agreement" state
is given authority to regulate in a complementary manner provided that
its regulations are compatible with the AEC's program. 7 However,
since there are no federal regulations on the particular aspect of the
field in question, how does one determine what is compatible with the
federal program? This question is easily answered in the area of transportation where the Department of Transportation has issued regulations governing interstate transportation of radioactive materials which
a state can readily adopt and apply to intrastate shipments. 77 Con72. This is simply another way of saying that Congress has preempted the field.
73. ATOMS AND THE LAW, supra note 24, at 1059.
74. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 297 U.S. 471 (1936). See generally Occupation of the Field,
supra note 45, at 266-270.
75. Occupation of the Field, supra note 45, at 266.
76. See Atomic Energy Act of 1954 §§ 274(b), (d), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b), (d)

(19,70).
77. See notes 112-115 infra and accompanying text.
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versely, the gaps left by the AEC in other areas, plant site location for
example, do not come within the jurisdiction of other federal agencies.
APPLICATION OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE:
PERMISSIBLE STATE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR REACTOR AND
PRODUCTION FACILITY SITING, TRANSPORTATION OF
NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND NUCLEAR

WASTE DISPOSAL

Discussion in this area will be devoted to an examination of
particular sections of the Atomic Energy Act and the regulations promulgated pursuant to them as they bear on various types of state legislation which could be enacted. The freedom of state regulation in a
particular area will ultimately depend on which of the four aforementioned categories it falls within. The federal statute and regulations
are givens, thus, only the terms and emphasis of the state legislation
can be varied to minimize interference with the federal scheme and
guide it away from the prohibitions of the preclusion dootrine.
The following exposition is intended to illustrate the pitfalls
associated with certain types of state legislation and hopefully will prevent the adoption of legislation which comes dangerously close to the
preclusion bar. In the following areas of discussion repeated reference
will not be made to the first category of federal-state interference, but
it must be remembered that this cardinal rule under the preemption
doctrine applies with equal force throughout: any state statute which
irreconcilably conflicts with the federal law is unconstitutional and void.
Nuclear Reactor and ProductionFacilitySiting Regulation
The location of nuclear facilities is a matter of vital concern to a
state. It is also an area in which reasonable regulation by the state
is likely to remain uncontested by the AEC.78 This is true because
in the area of land use planning there is a full array of concerns which
fall outside the field of regulation for radiological health and safety 39
However, as of September 1974 only eighteen states had passed power
plant siting laws and to the extent that this right is left unexer78. See Northern California Ass'n v. Public Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390
P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964); Cavers, supra note 23, at 50; Estep & Adelman,
supra note 5, at 61.
79. For example, guarding against thermal pollution and ensuring organized community development represent planning considerations distinct from a concern over radiation dangers.
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cised by the 0 states it will undoubtedly be taken over by the federal
8
government.
Of course, to some degree the regulation of radiological hazards
depends upon the location of nuclear facilities. And to this extent the
Atomic Energy Act authorizes action by the AEC. Section 101 of the
Act s ' establishes a licensing requirement for a broad range of activities
relating to production and utilization facilities, including the manufacture, production, acquisition, possession and use thereof. Sections
10382 and 1043 authorize the AEC to issue licenses for commercial
and medical or research purposes, respectively.
Complementing these grants of authority is section 16184 which
defines the broad scope of the AEC's general powers. Relevant portions include subsection (i)(3) which empowers the AEC to issue
regulations "to govern any activity authorized pursuant to [the Atomic
Energy Act], including standards and restrictions governing the design,
location, and operation of facilities. . . in order to protect health and
to minimize danger to life or property .

.

. ,,'r

Subsection (p) au-

thorizes the AEC to "make. . . such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this act."88
It is apparent that the AEC's authority regarding site selection is
plenary insofar as radiological health and safety are concerned. However, that agency has not acted to the full extent of its authority in
this area. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the aforementioned
sections of the Atomic Energy Act establish a license requirement for
production and utilization facilities8 7 and require the submission of a
report by the prospective licensee describing their proposed location, 8
80.
STATES,

SOUTHERN INTERSTATE NUCLEAR BOARD, POWER PLANT SITINO IN THE UNITED

at vii (1974).

The Energy Policy Staff has identified the long range planning

of power plant siting as a need. ENERGY POLICY STAFF, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ELECTRIC POWER AND THE ENviRONmENT, at 3 (1970). The Energy Reorgan-

ization Act of 1974 authorized a national survey to consider the location of future nuclear energy center sites. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 § 207 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 5847(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
81. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 2131 (1970).
82. Id. § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
83. Id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 2134 (1970).
84. Id. § 161, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
85. Id. § 161(i)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(i)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
86. Id.§ 161(p), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(p) (1970).
87. 40 FED. REG. 8788 (1975).
88. Id. at 8789. This regulation references another which sets forth the specific criteria to be considered, including meteorology, hydrology, geology and seismology data
necessary for evaluating measures proposed for protecting the public against possible radiation hazards. See 10 C.F.R. § 100.10 (1975).
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but there are no specific regulations set forth regarding the preferred
sites for these facilities.
Given the applicable statutory sections and regulations, what may
a state permissibly regulate in the area of facility siting? To begin
with, since the AEC has enacted no specific standards governing site
location, no problem of concurrent regulation is presented.8 9 Nevertheless, there is a possibility of complementary regulation in the field
of radiological health and safety.90
In speaking of this topic generally, the section 274 agreement was
suggested as a means for identifying the bounds of justifiable state
action. One condition of such an agreement is that the state's program
be compatible with the federal program. 91 Since the AEC has not
issued specific standards for location of facilities, it is difficult to determine what state regulations might meet this requirement. Furthermore, subsection (c)(1) of section 27492 and corresponding regulations 3 prohibit the delegation of authority over "the construction and
operation of any production or utilization facility . . . ,,94 to an

"agreement" state. Arguably, the terms "construction" and "operation" include regulations governing the location of these facilities as
well.9" And a "nonagreement" state should not presume to exercise
authority which it could not assume under an agreement with the
AEC."' Thus, given the uncertainty associated with this area, states'
attempts to regulate the radiological health and safety aspects of plant
siting risk successful challenge under the preemption doctrine.
It is agreed, however, that there is a broad range of regulation
open to the states in the area of site location for reasons which fall outside the radiological health and safety ambit.9 7 This bifurcation
(authority respecting radiological hazards in the AEC-residual
authority in the states) can lead to close questions. 98 For example, the
89. See note 58 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the terms "concurrent" and "complementary."
90. The question presented is whether a state may adopt specific standards governing facility location where the AEC has failed to set them.
91. See note 76 supra and accompanying text.
92. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1) (1970).
93. 10 C.F.R. § 150.15(a)(1) (1975).
94. Id.
95. The court in Northern States gave these terms a very broad construction to include authority over discharge of radioactive effluents. 447 F.2d at 1149.
96. See note 71 supra.
97. See authorities cited note 78 supra.
98. It has also been suggested that this division of authority prevents effective re-
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proximity of the site to geological faults certainly presents questions of
health and safety distinct from radiological considerations, yet radiological hazards are also influenced by this variable.

A particularly close case has been suggested where a state
attempts to regulate the location of nuclear facilities so as to minimize
the anxieties of its residents. 99 The legitimate state concern offered

to justify this action is said to be the right to ensure the orderly conduct
of its affairs, 10° a purpose independent of protection against radiation
hazards. This type of reasoning invites challenge under the preclusion
doctrine.

Carried to its logical end such a rationale could be used to

justify laws which require the location of nuclear facilities at such a
great distance from population centers that no installation could be
located within a state. 101 If this type of regulation became popular with
the states, soon there would be no place left in the United States to
locate a reactor. Obviously, means of this sort would be resisted and
the AEC, arguing either that this was a backhanded attempt at the
regulation of radiological safety or that such devices would defeat an

important objective of Congress,"

would make out a case of preemp-

tion and prevail on the merits.
In order to minimize the likelihood of a statute being declared

unconstitutional, a state should refrain from imposing unreasonable
conditions in its regulation of nuclear plant location. Whenever
possible the law should accord the same treatment to nuclear facilities
as nonnuclear facilities as, for instance, in the evenhanded application

of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the location of commercial and industrial operations in a residential area."' 3 Only in this way can a state
realistically expect to avoid the preclusion bar.
view of environmental factors in the site location decision-making process, Environmental Control of Nuclear Power Plants,supra note 56, at 32.
99. Adams, Regulation of Health and Safety in Private Atomic Energy Activities:
A Problem in Federal-State Relationships, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 163, 186-87 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Adams]; Cavers, supra note 23, at 51.
100. Adams, supra note 99, at 187.
101. For example, at one time Arizona attempted to pass a bill which would have
prohibited the construction of any reactor plant within 60 miles of a city of more than
100,000 persons, or within 40 miles of a city of more than 10,000. Such a bill, if
adopted by other legislatures, would have effectively outlawed reactors in 30 or more
states. Cavers, supra note 23, at 51. The Vermont legislature has recently passed a
measure which prohibits the location of nuclear powered electric generating plants
within the state without the approval of the general assembly. 30 VT. STAT. ANN. §
248(c) (Supp. 1975).
102. tSee note 57 supra and accompanying text.
103. Cavers, supra note 23, at 50; Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 61. Maryland
has recently adopted legislation for plant siting which has general application to all
forms of power generation. See MD. ANN.CoDE art. 66C, §§ 766-69 (Supp. 1975).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss3/6

16

Yates: Preemption under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State

1976]

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954

The Regulation of NuclearMaterials'Transportation
It is only when radioactive material is being transported

from one secure location to another that it leaves the scrutiny
of trained manpower, sensitive equipment and an industry
well versed in radiation safety. During this time it is most
vulnerable to accidental release of harmful radiation, but most
important, if release occurs it may go unrecognized."'
Among other -types of conduct, the "transfer" and "possession!' of

special nuclear material, source material, by-product material, and
production or utilization facilities come under the authority of the AEC
to control. 10 These specific grants of power are augmented by section
161 which confers broad general authority upon the AEC to establish
regulations "to piotect health or to minimize danger to life or property
... ,100 and "as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this
act."107 Notwithstanding the breadth of these provisions, the regulations promulgated pursuant to them expressly exempt common and
contract carriers from licensing requirements. 0 8 Thus, although the
shipper and receiver must be licensed' 0 9 and packaging standards must
be complied with, 110 the AEC exerts no direct control over the transportation services carrying radioactive shipments."'
However, this is not to say that the transportation of these
materials is free from federal regulation. Under the Department of
Transportation Acte1 2 the United States Department of Transportation
(DOT) has regulatory responsibility for safety in the transportation of
radioactive materials by all modes of transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, except postal shipments." 3 These regulations are adminis104. SouTHruu

INTERSTATE NucLEAR BoARD, RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TRANSPORTA-

at 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RADioAcnvE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION].
105. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 9H 57(a), 62, 101, 42 U.S.C. H9 2077(a), 2092,
2131 (1970); id.§ 81, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV, 1974). For definitions of these
terms see notes 15 & 18 supra.
106. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 161(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1970).
107. Id.§ 161(p), 42 U.S.C. § 22 0 1(p) (1970).
108. 10 C.F.R. H§ 70.12, 40.12, 30.12 (1975) (special nuclear material, source material and byproduct material, respectively); 40 Fsr. RE. 8788 (1975) (production and
utilization facilities).
109. 10 C.F.R. 9H 70.3, 40.3, 30.3 (1975); 40 FED. REG.8788 (1975).
110. 10 C.F.R. Part 71 (1975). See note 113 infra.
111. 1 CCH AToM. EN.L. REP. 14005 (1971).
112. Act of Oct. 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931.
113. RADIOACTvE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION, supra note 104, at 31. Under a
memorandum of understanding signed March 22, 1973 (which supercedes a 1966 agreement between AEC and DOT), DOT is to regulate handling and shipping of radioactive
material, while the AEC isto evaluate and approve package design. Id.at 16. See note
110 supra and accompanying text. DOT regulations concerning packaging are found
in 49 C.F.R. Parts 170-189 (1975).
TION,
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tered by the particular DOT subordinate agency which has jurisdiction
over the type of carrier involved. 114 Postal shipments are regulated by
1 15
the United States Postal service.
Since the AEC has not adopted regulations governing transporta-

tion, there is no problem of concurrent regulation of radiological health
and safety under the Atomic Energy Act.

16

But attempts to regulate

interstate shipments raise questions of concurrent regulation under the
Transportation Act and of complementary regulation under the Atomic
Energy Act. Under these circumstances it is doubtful that a state
would be permitted to regulate in any manner other than by adopting
17

the DOT controls.
On the other hand, a far more important question is whether a
state may regulate intrastate radioactive shipments, an aspect of the
radiological health and safety field not currently subject to federal control."
This presents a question of complementary regulation under
the Atomic Energy Act. Applying the technique developed earlier, an

examination of an "agreement" state's authority in this area will be used
to determine the limits on the authority of a "nonagreement" state.
States which have executed an agreement with the AEC can and

do regulate intrastate radioactive shipments, but subject to the requirement that their programs be compatible with the federal program. 10
As a practical matter, this means that "agreement" states apply DOT's
interstate standards ot intrastate transportation. 20 A "nonagreement"
state wishing to regulate intrastate shipments of radioactive material
should follow the same procedure.' 2'

114. RADIOACTrIV MTERIALS TRANSPORTAmTON, supra note 104, at 31. See generally
Adams, supra note 99, at 197-198; 1 CCH AToM. EN. L REP. par. 4005 (1971). The
following DOT regulations apply to transportation of radioactive materials: 49 C.F.R.
Parts 170-189 (1975) (rail and highway-ICC); 14 C.F.R. Part 103 (1975) (air transport-FAA); 46 C.F.R. Part 146 (1975) (water transport-Coast Guard).
115. Postal regulations are contained in 39 C.F.R. Parts 123-125 (1974).
116. See note 58 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the terms "concurrent" and "complementary."
117. One state was permitted to regulate interstate carriers by penalizing them for
failure to obtain an ICC permit. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949). By analogy,
states might be permitted to enforce the federal regulations concerning radioactive shipments in interstate commerce.
118. Currently, most shipments are in interstate commerce. RADIOACTIVE MATERU
TRASPORTATION,
S
supra note 104, at 3. Furthermore, DOT has jurisdiction over
intrastate shipments transported by licensed interstate carriers. ld. at 31.
119. RADIOACTIvE MATEALs TRANSPORTA ON, supra note 104, at 36.
120. Id.
121. 1 F. GRAD, TREATIsE ON ENVIRONUENTAL LAW § 6.03, at 50 (1973). As further support for this position, consider the case of Illinois, a "nonagreement" state,
which regulates the disposal of "low-level" radioactive wastes under the uniform federal
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Of course, any state can govern these shipments for purposes

distinct from radiological health and safety regulation.' 2 2 This would
include the enforcement of all transportation safety regulations, traffic

to interstate and intralaws and other enactments generally applicable
1 23
jurisdiction.
its
to
state transportation subject
The Regulation of Radioactive Waste Disposal
"Radioactive waste materials . . . may be in the form of source

material, by-product materials, or special nuclear material, or a combination of these."' 24 By virtue of the sections of the Atomic Energy
Act specifically dealing with the licensing requirements for these

materials 2 1 and the general powers conferred by section 161,126 the
AEC has broad authority over their disposal.
Pursuant to these sections the AEC has adopted regulations

governing waste disposal.

Subject to limited exceptions, they provide

that the proposed disposal procedures for "licensed material'

the specific approval of the

AEC. "28
'

27

require

Furthermore, "high-lever'

wastes 1 29 must be transferred to a federal repository for perpetual care
regulations it has adopted. See note 144 infra and accompanying text. It has been suggested that a state may go further in regulating transportation than to merely adopt the
federal controls because it is predominantly a "local concern." Adams, supra note 99,
at 198. Another argument supporting this view is that the transportation takes place
on state owned highways and to permit federal supersedure in such a case would amount
to a taking of state property without compensation to promote a federally desired use.
Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 54. A simple answer to this is that the federal government could condition receipt of interstate highway funds by a state on the reasonableness of its regulations governing transportation of radioactive material. At the very
least these regulations would have to be compatible with the federal atomic energy program. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. To meet this compatibility requirement most states would simply prefer to adopt the applicable federal regulations.
122. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
123. But regulations that discriminate against radioactive shipments and unreasonably hinder development of the nuclear industry within the state may be found invalid.
See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
124. 1 CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 4011 (1972). For definitions of these terms see
notes 15 & 18 supra.
125. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 §§ 62, 57(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2092, 2077(a) (1970);
id. § 81, 42 U.S.C. § 2111 (Supp. IV, 1974).
126. Id. § 161, 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
127. '"icensed material" is simply source, by-product, and special nuclear material
for which the AEC regulations require a license. See 10 C.F.R. H§ 40.3, 30.3, 70.3
(1975). Exceptions include common carriers (see note 108 supra and accompanying
text) and persons licensed by an "agreement" state, subject to some important limitations, however (see note 141 infra and accompanying text).
128. 10 C.F.R. § 20.301 (1975).
129. A layman's definition of "high-level" wastes is those which, by virtue of their
radioactivity, half-life, and biological significance, require perpetual isolation from the
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at which time the AEC takes title to them. 1 0 Disposal of high-level
wastes is not permitted except on land owned and controlled by the

federal government.1.3

Generally, "low-lever' radioactive wastes 8 2

must be disposed of on land owned by the federal government or by

a state government.'

33

The low-level waste disposal sites are operated

by private commercial enterprises.

34

What confronts the states in attempting to regulate this subject is
not only the broad statutory powers vested in the AEC by the Atomic
Energy Act, but also an extraordinarily complete exercise of that
authority by the AEC." 5 Thus, no real question of complementary
regulation under the Atomic Energy Act is presented, since the AEC
is regulating this entire aspect of the field.' 3 6 Turning now to the

question of concurrent regulation, the section 274 agreement will again
be used to prescribe the permissible extent of control by a "nonagreement" state.
Subsection (c)(4) of section 274 provides that authority for

disposal of "hazardous" source, by-product and special nuclear materials shall be retained by the AEC at its discretion.' 37

The correspond-

ing regulations do not permit an "agreement" state to assume the
responsibility for regulating the disposal of high-level wastes. 33 Thus,
1 SouTnEN INTERSTATE NUCLEEr BOARD, RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGE22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as RADIOACTrVE WASTE MANAGEMENT]. For the
technical definition see 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(2) (1975).
130. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(2) (1975).
131. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. F(3) (1975).
132. A layman's definition of "low-level" wastes is those which have a radioactive
content sufficiently low to permit discharge to the environment with reasonable dilution
or after relatively simple processing. RADIOACWivE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note
129, at 21. There are also "intermediate level" wastes which are treated to produce lowlevel and high-level wastes and disposed of accordingly. Id.
133. 10 C.F.R. § 20.302(b) (1975). There are limited exceptions for disposal by
release into sanitary sewage systems (10 C.F.R. § 20.303 (1975)) and for burial in soil
(10 C.F.R. § 20.304 (1975)).
134. See RADIOACTIE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 129, at 37. There are currently three such companies operating six land burial facilities (located in Kentucky,
South Carolina, New York, Illinois, Washington and Nevada). Five of these are on
land owned by the state and the sixth is on federally owned property which is leased
to the state. Id. at 37-38.
135. Unless the wastes are disposed of by release into the sanitary sewer system or
by burial by the licensee, both of which must comply with rigid guidelines for permissible concentration levels (see 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.303, 20.304 (1975)), the AEC must specifically approve the proposed procedures for disposal of "licensed material." 10 C.F.R.
§ 20.302 (1975). See note 127 supra for the definition of this term.
136. See note 58 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the terms "complementary" and "concurrent."
137. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(c) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (4) (1970).
138. 10 C.F.R. §§ 150.15(a) (4), (5) (1975). See also notes 129-131 supra and accompanying text.

biosphere.
MENT
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417

a "nonagreement" state would not be justified in governing here
39
either.1
The disposal of source, by-product and special nuclear materials
not licensed by the AEC is controlled by the "agreement" state.1 4 °
Subject to certain exceptions (including the disposal of high-level
wastes), section 274 and the related regulations permit an "agreement"
state to assume the AEC's authority with regard to these materials,
1 41
thereby dispensing with the federal licensing requirement.
Therefore, it is clear that an "agreement" state may regulate the
disposal of low-level wastes, provided that its regulatory program is
compatible with the federal program. 4 2 This suggests that a "nonagreement" state would be permitted to regulate low-level waste
disposal upon adopting the uniform AEC regulations applicable to this
function. 4 3 This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that one of the
six existing low-level waste burial sites is located in a "nonagreement"
state1 44 and, although the operator of that site receives his license from
the AEC, he conducts the burial operations under the provisions of a
45
permit by the state.'
The final inquiry in this area concerns the extent of legitimate
state control over matters outside the field occupied by the Atomic
Energy Act (viz., matters not concerning the regulation of radiological
hazards). Because high-level wastes are delivered to a federal reservation for ultimate disposal the state has no authority, absent consent
from the federal government, to regulate any aspect of the operation,
including matters not related to radiological health and safety. 4 6 But
as to low-level waste disposal sites there can be little doubt of a state's
right to control. Assuming that, since a state dedicated its own land
139. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
140. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 129, at 39; Swan, Management
of High-Level Radioactive Wastes: The AEC and the Legal Process, LAw & Soc. ORDER
263, 287 (1973).
141. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1970); 10 C.F.R.
§ 150.10 (1975).
142. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 274(d) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2) (1970).
143. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
144. Illinois.
145. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, supra note 129, at 41. Additionally, the

fact that the state owns the land may be used to justify regulation in the absence of
an agreement with the AEC. See Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 54.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 17; Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943) (state law is effective of its own force on federal enclaves
only when the sale of that land to the United States is conditioned upon the state's retention of jurisdiction).
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for this purpose, it would not attempt to impose unreasonable restrictions on the waste disposal operations, 147 the state would have complete
control over everything beyond radiological health and safety regulation. This is especially true considering that these activities would be
48
taking place on state owned property.1
CONCLUSION

The Atomic Energy Act preempts the field of regulation for
radiological health and safety concerning source materials, by-product
materials, special nuclear materials and nuclear production and utilization facilities. States may regulate all matters not contained within the
preempted field, provided that they do not unreasonably interfere with
the development of the nuclear industry.
In 1959 Congress amended the Act to allow states to execute an
agreement with the Atomic Energy Commission whereby they assume
full responsibility for certain aspects of radiological health and safety
regulation. The legislative history of the 1959 amendment reveals a
congressional intent that state regulation should not be permitted to
conflict with the federal goals of promoting nuclear energy and protecting the public against radiation hazards. Because of this the amendment requires that state regulations in "agreement" states be compatible with the federal program.
It is believed that a "nonagreement" state can also regulate to the
extent that it would be allowed if it entered into an agreement with
the AEC, provided that its controls are compatible with the federal
regulations and are competently enforced. Based on this premise
guidelines were prescribed for permissible state legislation governing
radiation hazards in the areas of plant siting, transportation of radioactive materials and radioactive waste disposal. Allowable state regulation for other than radiological health and safety reasons in these three
areas was also examined.
In the area of facilities' location, the state should adopt legislation
having general application to nuclear and nonnuclear plants. Attempts
to set special standards for nuclear facilities will risk successful
challenge under the preemption doctrine. The state should not
attempt to regulate radiation hazards in this area.
147. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
148. Estep & Adelman, supra note 5, at 54.
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Regulation of radiation hazards concerning radioactive materials'
transportation in intrastate commerce (and perhaps even in interstate
commerce) can be accomplished by adopting the Department of Transportation's regulations governing radioactive shipments. States may
regulate transportation of these materials for other than radiological
health and safety reasons, provided that they do not unreasonably
restrict this flow of commerce.
States may regulate low-level radioactive waste disposal by
adopting the AEC's rules governing this conduct. I-Igh-level waste disposal is exclusively the concern of the federal government and may not
be regulated in any manner by a state.
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Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975

23

